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In a series of classic works, most notably The Visible Hand (1977) and Scale 
and Scope (1990), Alfred Chandler focused the spotlight on the large, vertically 
integrated corporation.  He did this not merely to chronicle the rise of that 
institution but also to explain it and to give it a prominent place in American 
economic growth during the last century and a half.  Put simply, Chandler’s 
argument is this.  In the late nineteenth century, the large vertically integrated 
corporation emerged in the United States to replace what had been a fragmented 
and localized structure of production and distribution.  The driving force behind 
this transformation was increased population and higher per-capita income, 
combined with lowered transportation and communications costs made possible 
by the spread of the railroad, ocean shipping, and the telegraph.   
Adam Smith (1976) had predicted an increasingly fine division of labor as 
the response to a growing extent of the market; and, although he was actually 
quite vague on the organizational consequences of the division of labor, Smith 
was clear in his insistence on the power of the invisible hand of markets to 
coordinate economic activity.1  Chandler’s account appears to challenge this 
                                                 
1  In what follows, I will often appear to conform to the now rather outdated distinction 
between markets and hierarchies, as that seems the best idiom in which to engage the issues 
as Chandler raises them.  Nonetheless, I hope that the narrative will convey, perhaps subtly, 
my belief that “the market” encompasses a wide range of forms many of which are not 
anonymous spot contracts but rather have “firm-like” characteristics of duration, trust, and 
the transfer of rich information.  As Brian Loasby (1993, p. 248) puts it, “[m]arkets, like firms 
(and academic disciplines), need to be organised, and organisation implies some degree of 
management.  Organisation, as Marshall observed, aids knowledge, and whether internal or 
external organisation (Marshall’s terms …) matters most depends on where the relevant 
knowledge is concentrated.”  For an extensive discussion of “network” forms of 
organization, see Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
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prediction: internal or managerial coordination became necessary to coordinate 
the “new economy” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
“Technological innovation, the rapid growth and spread of population, and 
expanding per capita income made the processes of production and distribution 
more complex and increased the speed and volume of the flow of materials 
through them.  Existing market mechanisms were often no longer able to 
coordinate these flows effectively.  The new technologies and expanding markets 
thus created for the first time a need for administrative coordination.  To carry 
out this function entrepreneurs built multiunit business enterprises and hired the 
managers needed to administer them.” (Chandler 1977, p. 484.)  Thus the visible 
hand of managerial coordination replaced the invisible hand of the market. 
Many would argue that the late twentieth (and now early twenty-first) 
centuries are witnessing a revolution at least as important as the one Chandler 
described.  Population, income, and economic integration are again driving 
forces, but the railroad and telegraph have been replaced by the computer, 
telecommunications technology, and the Internet.  In this epoch, Smithian forces 
may be outpacing Chandlerian ones.  We are experiencing a structural revolution 
as profound as the one of the late nineteenth century.  With the help of present-
day digital technologies, production is becoming increasingly modular and 
increasingly coordinated through trading on thick markets.  Management retains 
important functions, of course, including some of the same ones Chandler 
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described.  But as the central mechanism for coordinating high-throughput 
production, the visible hand — many would argue — is fading into a ghostly 
translucence.2   
This paper is a preliminary attempt to explain why this is so — to provide 
some theoretical insight into the organizational structure of the new economy.  
The basic argument — the vanishing-hand hypothesis — is as follows.  Driven by 
increases in population and income and by the reduction of technological and 
legal barriers to trade, the Smithian process of the division of labor always tends 
to lead to finer specialization of function and increased coordination through 
markets, much as Allyn Young (1928) claimed long ago.  But the components of 
that process —technology, organization, and institutions — change at different 
rates.  The managerial revolution Chandler chronicles was the result of such an 
imbalance, in this case between the coordination needs of high-throughput 
technologies and the abilities of contemporary markets and contemporary 
technologies of coordination to meet those needs.  With further growth in the 
extent of the market and improvements in the technology of coordination, the 
central management of vertically integrated production stages is increasingly 
succumbing to the forces of specialization. 
                                                 
2  The cover story of the April 30, 2001 issue of Forbes documents in considerable detail the 
trend in modern industry toward vertical disintegration and contract manufacturing (Dolan 
and Meredith 2001).  Significantly, the piece is titled “Ghost Cars, Ghost Brands.”   
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The evolutionary design problem. 
Industrial structure is really about two interrelated but conceptually distinct 
systems: the technology of production and the organizational structure that 
directs production.  These systems jointly must solve the problem of value: how 
to deliver the most utility to ultimate consumers at the lowest cost.  Industrial 
structure is thus an evolutionary design problem.  It is also a continually 
changing problem, one continually posed in new ways by factors like 
population, real income, and the changing technology of production and 
transaction.  It was one of the founding insights of transaction-cost economics 
that the technological system does not fully determine the organizational system 
(Williamson 1975).  Organizations — governance structures — bring with them 
their own costs, which need to be taken into account.  But technology clearly 
affects organization.  This is Chandler’s claim.  The large-scale, high-throughput 
technology of the nineteenth century “required” vertical integration and 
conscious managerial attention.  In order to explicate this claim, we need to 
explore the nature of the evolutionary design problem that industrial structure 
must solve. 
Like a biological organism, an organization confronts an environment that 
is changing, variable, and uncertain.  To survive and prosper, the organization 
must perceive and interpret a variety of signals from the environment and adjust 
its conduct in light of those signals.  In short, organizations are information 
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processing systems.  This is no less true of early nineteenth century production 
networks than it is of an Internet-enabled firm of today: in a real sense, the 
economy has long been a knowledge economy.  Also like biological organisms, 
business organizations differ in the mechanisms they use to process information 
and to deal with variation and uncertainty.  Nonetheless, as James Thompson 
(1967, p. 20) argued, all organizations respond to a changing environment by 
seeking to “buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores 
with input and output components.”  Understanding the ways in which 
organizations buffer uncertainty is thus crucial to understanding organizational 
structure. 
In Thompson’s discussion, buffers seem to take many forms.  The “input 
and output components” he refers to are various kinds of shock-absorbers 
mediating between a highly variable environment and a more predictable 
production process.  Inventories are a classic example: they can ebb and swell 
with changes in demand or supply while allowing a smooth flow of product.  
But Thompson also mentions preventive maintenance, which reduces the 
number of unplanned outages, as well as the training or indoctrination of 
personnel, which reduces variability in human performance.   
Arthur Stinchcombe (1990) has picked up the human-performance thread 
and pulled it in a more interesting and useful direction.  In his interpretation, a 
skilled human is an information-processing system that can serve as an 
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important element in the process of buffering uncertainty.  Human cognition can 
often interpret the data from a complex environment and translate that data into 
the kinds of predictable or routine information the productive system can use.  
For example, a professor translates the complex information on an essay exam 
into a letter grade that the Registrar’s office can process; a physician translates 
the complex inputs from observation and medical instrumentation into a 
diagnosis, which results in a relatively unambiguous set of instructions for 
nurses, pharmacists, patients, etc. (Stinchcombe 1990, chapter 2).  Businesspeople 
serve a similar function.  They translate complex data from the economic 
environment into a more-or-less predictable flow of outputs — contracts signed, 
products delivered, etc.  We might even go so far as to associate the buffering 
role that human cognition plays in business with the very idea of management. 
Levinthal and March (1993, p. 98) add a perspective on buffering that is 
relevant to my argument.  They associate Thompson’s notion with the late 
Herbert Simon’s (1962) well-known analysis of system decomposition.  A 
decomposable system is one that is cut into pieces or “modularized” in such a way 
that most interactions (which we can think of as flows of information) take place 
within the modules; interactions among modules are kept to a minimum and are 
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regularized through formal “interfaces.”3  One of the prime benefits of 
decomposability, in Simon’s view, is that it allows for greater stability in the face 
of environmental uncertainty: a single piece can be altered, replaced, or even 
destroyed without threatening the survival of the whole.  This is already a kind 
of buffering.  Levinthal and March point out that decomposition entails (or at 
least allows) “loose coupling” between organizational units, which effectively 
simplifies the information-processing problem the organization faces.  Each 
department can concentrate on the local consequences of the information it 
receives from the environment without having to contemplate the global 
implications.  Computer scientists would call this distributed processing.  And 
economists would recognize the argument as akin to Hayek’s (1945) famous 
account of the price system as a well-decomposed information-processing 
system.  Indeed, I will suggest before long that the decomposition of 
organization into market can sometimes confer additional buffering benefits well 
known to economists, notably the ability to spread risks.   
In what follows, I trace the history of how organization in the United 
States has confronted its evolutionary design problem over the last two centuries.  
The underlying process, I argue, is the Smithian one of specialization and 
differentiation of function.  But, as expanding markets and technological change 
                                                 
3  A perfectly decomposable system is one in which all interactions are kept within the 
subsystems.  In reality, however, the best we can probably hope for is a system that is nearly 
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altered the economic environment, so were altered the buffering problems 
industry faced.  The managerial revolution of the nineteenth century was one 
solution to the buffering problem, appropriate to its time and place.  But it is by 
no means the only solution industry has found; and it is certainly not the 
approach toward which the new economy is gravitating.  
Antebellum organization. 
Along one dimension, the American system of production and distribution in the 
early years of the nineteenth century was indeed coordinated by the invisible 
hand of the market.  The high cost of inland transportation created many isolated 
local markets, leading to a fragmented and decentralized system of production 
and distribution.4  To the extent that it was possible to aggregate demands, it was 
the independent merchant or middleman who did so.   
Looked at in another way, however, the antebellum value chain reflected 
a low level of specialization, just as one would expect in a thinly populated 
country with poorly integrated regional markets.  The focus of the economy was 
not on manufacturing, which was still a matter of local crafts production, but 
rather on trade.  And the central actors were the all-purpose generalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
decomposable.  For a further discussion of these ideas and of the theory of modular systems 
more generally, see Langlois (2002). 
4  The main constraint, of course, was the capacity of horse-drawn carriage and the sorry state 
of the network of dirt roads.  Indeed, as late as the early twentieth century, “economists 
estimated that it cost more to haul a bushel of wheat along ten miles of American dirt road 
than it did to ship it across the ocean from New York to Liverpool” (Gladwell 2001, p. 13). 
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merchants.  Rather than concentrating on a narrow range of commodities or on a 
single aspect of trade, the merchants diversified widely; and they acquired a 
wide range of skills necessary to trade.5  The merchants were generalists, of 
course, because the volume of trade was too small to support specialization.  
Only by aggregating demands for a variety of types of goods could they generate 
sufficient scale to employ their overhead resources adequately.  This meant in 
addition that marketing techniques, and in many cases the goods themselves, 
remained “generic” or nonspecialized in order to permit the necessary 
diversification. 
Since the antebellum industrial system relied heavily on markets to 
coordinate among stages of production and distribution, there was a certain 
amount of “loose coupling” that helped to buffer variation.  Inventories were no 
doubt in widespread use.  More generally, the system employed as a buffering 
mechanism what Jay Galbraith (1973, pp. 22ff.) called “slack resources”:  the 
antebellum economy was not a fast-paced, high-throughput system.  But it’s also 
important to notice that, because the system reflected a relatively low level of 
division of labor in the Smithian sense, much of the coupling, loose or otherwise, 
                                                 
5  “The merchants’ strength rested not so much on their mastery of the ancillary techniques of 
shipping, insurance, finance, and the like, as on their ability to use them in support of the 
fundamental trading function, buying and selling at a profit.  The merchants exercised this 
function over a range of goods as varied as the commercial techniques they employed.  The 
histories of individual firms, as well as merchants’ advertisements in colonial and early 
national period newspapers, demonstrate the merchants’ willingness to sell anything that 
offered a profit.  Coffee, sugar, iron, cloth — all were grist for the merchants’ mills” (Porter 
and Livesay 1971, p. 17).  
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was effected by human cognition.  Each stage of production encompassed many 
sub-stages that a larger extent of the market might have transformed into 
specialties.  As a result, buffering by skilled humans played an important role.  In 
crafts production, for example, both parts and finished products could exhibit 
considerable variation because the artisan, who personally undertook all or most 
stages of production, was able to buffer the variation in the parts and the 
variation in the tastes of consumers.  Wielding a wide repertoire of skills in a 
flexible way (Leijonhufvud 1986), a crafts artisan can translate complex 
information about tastes and technology into a working finished product.   
The most important buffers in the antebellum period (and indeed for 
centuries before that) were the generalist merchants.  It was they who in effect 
provided the (loose) coupling within the market economy.  Despite the recurrent 
features of trading in otherwise diverse goods, the thinness of antebellum 
markets confronted these merchants with a wide variety of concrete 
circumstances and special problems to solve on a daily basis.  Like crafts artisans, 
they needed to integrate a wide variety of tasks and process a wide range of 
signals from the environment.  What enabled them to solve these complex 
information processing problems was the width of their sets of skills and their 
flexibility in matching skills to problems (Stinchcombe 1990, pp. 33-38).  They 
noticed profit opportunities and solved a myriad practical problems in a way 
that resulted in the more-or-less smooth delivery of goods and services.  In the 
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low-fixed-cost economy of the period, profitability depended not on the 
ownership of tangible assets but on specialized knowledge and the ability to 
adapt. 
In the years after 1815, population growth, geographical expansion, and 
international trade (especially in cotton) combined to increase the extent of the 
market in a classic Smithian way: by an increase in the volume of goods traded 
but without much change in the nature of those goods (Porter and Livesay 1971, 
p. 17).  And, as one would predict, merchants began to specialize to a somewhat 
greater extent by commodity or function, almost always by means of specialized 
firms rather than through intra-firm specialization.   
But merchants were far from completely specialized.  Importantly, many 
merchants combined the middleman function with a financial function, 
something that was crucial for the development of American manufacturing 
before the Civil War (Porter and Livesay 1971, pp. 71ff.).  As America began 
industrializing, the manufacturing sector was chronically undercapitalized, 
especially with respect to working capital.  Investment is always a difficult 
business because of the problem of asymmetric information: the borrower 
typically has better information about his or her prospects than does the lender.  
In the absence of institutions designed to reduce these “agency costs,” lenders 
will be reluctant to part with their money unless they have good information 
about the borrower and can cheaply monitor the use of the funds.  Many firms in 
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the metals and mechanical trades were forced to rely on the private funds of the 
owner-manager or on retained earnings.  Increasingly, however, merchants 
became an important source of financing.  Since they dealt regularly with the 
manufacturers, they had knowledge of their operations and could observe the 
use of funds lent.6  To the extent that banks of the period helped finance 
industrial development, they did so not as arms’-length lenders but as inside 
lenders to the networks of merchants and manufacturers who were their 
                                                 
6  For example, the merchant James Laughlin bankrolled the Jones and Lauth iron works, 
which prospered to become the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation (Porter and Livesay 
1971, p. 67). 
Stage 1
Middleman
Stage 2
Middleman
Stage 3
 
Figure 1: the antebellum value chain. 
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principal stockholders.7  We can understand this as an instance of using human 
information processing as a “buffer” on the financial side:  closely observing 
production, or even taking a hand in directing it, is a way of managing the 
uncertainty of capital provision. 
As Figure 1 suggests, then, the “value chain” in the U. S. in the early years 
of the nineteenth century was one dominated by merchant middlemen, who 
lowered transaction and agency costs by aggregating outputs and demands from 
widely dispersed producers and consumers as well as providing capital for the 
growth of manufacturing.   
The managerial revolution. 
Is change ultimately a gradual process or is it one that operates through 
discontinuous jumps or revolutions?  This is one of the hoary questions of 
economic history — and, indeed, of social theory more generally.  One’s answer 
to the question is almost always a matter of perspective.  From one viewpoint, 
for example, the coming of the railroad and telegraph by the time of the Civil 
War was merely the continuation of a process of decreasing transportation costs 
                                                 
7  As Naomi Lamoreaux (1986, p. 659) has shown, the function of banks in this era “was to 
serve as the financial arms of the extended kinship groups that dominated the economy.  As 
such, banks provided kinship groups with a stable institutional base from which to raise the 
capital consumed by their diverse business enterprises.  Like their modern counterparts, 
then, early banks tapped the savings of the surrounding community, but they did so mainly 
selling shares of stock, not by attracting deposits.  This too was an important difference.  It 
meant that these early institutions functioned less like modern commercial banks and more 
like investment pools through which outsiders could participate in the kinship groups’ 
diverse enterprises.” 
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already in motion.  By 1857, one could travel about twice as far from New York 
in a day as had been possible in 1830.  But the same could be said of the change 
between 1800 and 1830 (Paullin 1932, plate 138).  From another viewpoint, 
however, the railroad and telegraph had a profound and discontinuous effect on 
the organization of production and distribution in the United States. 
The important consequence of the lowering of transportation and 
communications costs, of course, was the collapse of geographical barriers and 
the increasing integration of the domestic market.  In effect, nineteenth-century 
technical change in transportation and communication brought about an all-
American version of “globalization,” a topic to which we will return.  Larger 
markets made it possible to adopt new techniques in many transformational and 
distributional stages in order to take advantage of economies of scale.8  With 
larger markets to serve, it became economical to reorganize some stages using a 
finer and more coordinated division of labor, what Leijonhufvud (1986) calls 
factory production.  It also became economical to use larger and more durable 
machines that were often capable of integrating multiple stages of production.9  
In both cases, larger markets allowed a shift to higher-fixed-cost methods, which 
                                                 
8  This is not to say that the rise of large establishments and mass production obliterated 
specialty producers or the market economy.  As many commentators on Chandler have 
insisted (Atack 1986, Supple 1991, Scranton 1997), small-scale flexible production grew 
alongside the large firms, provided those firms with many needed inputs, and contributed 
importantly to economic growth.  Nonetheless, the multi-unit mass-producers represented 
an important new element to industrial structure, one calling out for economic explanation. 
9  I distinguish these two results of the increasing extent of the market as the division-of-labor 
effect and the volume effect (Langlois 1999a, 1999b). 
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were capable of lowering unit costs — often dramatically — at high levels of 
output. 
All of this altered the value chain in two ways.  First, it reduced the 
number of establishments necessary at some transformation and distribution 
stages.  When market size permits economies of scale, a few large plants can 
operate more cheaply — often far more cheaply — than a larger number of small 
plants.  As Chandler tells the tale, consolidation often played out through a set of 
typical episodes.  First came the cartel, in which previously insulated 
competitors, having suddenly found themselves operating in the same large 
market, attempted to manage the allocation of output.  Predictably, this met with 
little success, which prompted the formation of a holding company.  By pooling 
ownership in a single meta-company, in which each individual owner would 
take a share, the holding company transformed an incentive to cheat on the cartel 
into an incentive to maximize total capital value.  The unintended consequence 
of this, however, was that the holding company took on a life of its own.  
Especially as the original owners died out or cashed out, the head office began 
managing production and investment in increasingly coherent ways, normally 
with a view to consolidating production in the larger and more efficient plants.  
The culmination of this was the multidivisional (M-Form) corporation in the 
twentieth century, in which the old structure of many identical independent 
producers had been transmogrified into a unified structure with a wholly new 
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functional division of administrative responsibility.  Not all cases followed this 
model, of course.  In fields with few incumbent producers, large unified firms 
grew up more-or-less directly. 
The position of the middleman in the value chain also changed 
dramatically.  As transformation and distribution stages grew in size and shrank 
in numbers, independent wholesalers were increasingly replaced by in-house 
purchasing and marketing units.  This was so for two reasons.  First, the 
demands of the high-throughput producers began reaching and exceeding the 
capacities of the middlemen, thus eliminating one of the primary raisons d’être of 
wholesalers, the ability to work at higher volumes than one’s customers10 
(Chandler 1990, p. 29).  Second, standardization of inputs and outputs militated 
against another of the merchant’s comparative advantages, the ability to deal 
with a diverse set of products (Porter and Livesay 1971).  In some cases, like 
petroleum, producers integrated all the way from raw materials to the final 
consumer (McLean and Haigh 1954).  See Figure 2. 
                                                 
10  As John D. Rockefeller said of Standard Oil, “we had to create selling methods far in 
advance of what then existed; we had to dispose of two, or three, or four gallons of oil where 
one had been sold before, and we could not rely upon the usual trade channels then existing 
to accomplish this.”  (Quoted in Chernow 1998, p. 252.) 
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Chandler stresses the ways in which this process differed from what the 
Smithian division of labor would have predicted; that is, he focuses on the ways 
in which integration bypassed market relations among previously distinct stages.  
But it is important to notice that, however visible the hand of management had 
become, the process Chandler describes is at one level a fundamentally Smithian 
one.  The rise of the modern corporation is very much about increased 
specialization of function.  In an owner-managed firm, management is a craft 
engaged in by amateurs; in the modern corporation, management is a 
 
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
 
 
 
Figure 2: the Chandlerian value chain. 
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profession.11  Moreover, the multidivisional structure that modern corporations 
came to adopt in the twentieth century reflects a decoupling of the strategic 
functions from the day-to-day functions of management in order to cope with the 
greater demands on managerial attention12 (Williamson 1985, pp. 279-283).   
The clearest and most significant way in which the rise of the modern 
corporation reflects specialization and division of labor, of course, is on the 
financial side.  The corporation evolved in conjunction with developments in 
securities markets throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(and, as we’ll see, beyond).  These developments encouraged the separation of 
ownership from control by creating alienable securities that could be traded on 
increasingly liquid markets.  What made such markets possible was the 
development of social institutions like the limited liability corporation as well as 
standardized techniques for accounting and financial reporting.  These latter 
made it easier for investors to ascertain the value of securities without detailed 
                                                 
11  Take note that, although specialized to management, the manager was a generalist along 
another important direction: the manager was skilled in general techniques of management 
independent of any specific firm or industry.  I return to this point below. 
12  In Chandler’s eyes, this progressive specialization and separation of function during the rise 
of the large corporation is indeed a large part of the secret of that system’s success.  He 
blames what he perceives to be Britain’s lag behind the U. S. and Germany on precisely the 
British inability to specialize. “In most British enterprises senior executives worked closely 
in the same office building, located in or near the largest plant, having almost daily personal 
contact with, and thus directly supervising, middle and often lower-level managers.  Such 
enterprises had no need for the detailed organization charts and manuals that had come into 
common use in large American and German firms before 1914.  In these British companies, 
selection to senior positions and to the board depended as much on personal ties as on 
managerial competence.  The founders and their heirs continued to have a significant 
influence on top-level decision-making even after their holdings in the enterprise were 
diminished.” (Chandler 1990, p. 242.)  
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knowledge of the business or geographic proximity to it, thus somewhat 
attenuating the costs of asymmetric information (Baskin 1988, pp. 227-230).  By 
reducing the entry requirements to capital supply and by permitting 
unprecedented opportunities for risk diversification, the development of 
anonymous securities markets lowered the costs of capital for high-throughput 
projects and allowed managers to lay off some of the risks — that is, the financial 
risks — on anonymous markets (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  In effect, then, the 
function of “buffering” financial uncertainties was transferred in part from 
human information processors — generalist managers — to external market 
institutions armed with the buffering mechanism of portfolio diversification.   
Nonetheless, as Chandler insists, along another dimension the rise of the 
large corporation reflected a process of reduced specialization.  Whereas distinct 
sets of managers had once supervised each stage of production, with only the 
market standing above them, in the era of the large corporation a single set of 
managers came to supervise multiple stages of production.  At the operational 
level, of course, the division of labor didn’t necessarily decrease and may have 
increased.  Each subunit of the large corporation had its specialized managers, 
the counterparts to the managers of the previously distinct stages.  Integration of 
the management function took place at a “corporate” level higher than the day-
to-day managers.  The head office oversaw multiple stages of production in 
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much the way a crafts artisan may have overseen multiple stages in the making 
of an artifact.   
Why integration?  I have long argued that one can’t explain organizational 
structures without looking at the dynamic processes in which they are created 
(Langlois 1984).  In my view, centralized organization often supplants more 
decentralized organization when technological and market opportunities call for 
a systemic reorganization of the structure of production and distribution.  This is 
so for the same reason that decision-making becomes more centralized during a 
war or other crisis.  When many different pieces of the system must be changed 
simultaneously to create new value, centralized control can often help overcome 
the narrow visions of the local participants, and centralized ownership can more 
easily trump the vested interests of those participants (Langlois 1988; Bolton and 
Farrell 1990).  In short, vertical integration often occurs when it can overcome the 
dynamic transaction costs of systemic change (Langlois 1992b). 
In many of the nineteenth-century industries Chandler chronicles, the 
possibilities of economies of scale at various transformation stages called for 
systemic reorganization in other complementary parts of the system.  Consider 
the story of refrigerated meatpacking (Chandler 1977, p. 299 ff.; Porter and 
Livesay 1971, pp. 168-173).  In the 1870s, the developing railroad network had 
permitted the shipment of western meat on the hoof to eastern markets, thus 
taking advantage of economies of scale in western pasturing.  But further 
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economies of scale were possible, and Gustavus Swift realized that, if the system 
of meat packing, shipping, and distribution were completely redesigned, it 
would be possible to reduce transportation costs and to take advantage of a 
number of scale economies, including those of a “disassembly line” in a high-
throughput slaughterhouse.  Claiming these economies required changing 
complementary assets and capabilities throughout the system, including the 
development and production of refrigerated rail cars and the establishment of a 
nation-wide network of properly equipped branch houses to store and 
merchandise the meat.  Swift found it more economical to integrate into many of 
these complementary stages than to face the dynamic transaction costs of 
persuading the various asset owners to cooperate with him through the market.13  
                                                 
13  Raff and Temin (1991) have attempted to interpret this episode within the strict confines of 
the doctrine of asset specificity (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978).  According to this 
doctrine, which has arguably become the dominant explanation of vertical integration in the 
literature of academic economics, cooperating parties are impelled to merge their operations 
when one or both hold assets highly specific to the transaction they contemplate.  This is 
because in a market setting one of the parties could threaten the other with “hold-up,” thus 
putting the specific assets at risk.  Raff and Temin make an excellent case.  But the case they 
make is mine.  They claim that Swift integrated widely because (and only because) all of the 
assets he came to own were transaction specific and would have put him at risk of 
expropriation had he left them in the hands of others.  Some of the assets involved – railroad 
cars, maybe – might fit this profile.  But many other things Swift bought – like ice --were 
clearly generic commodities obtainable in thick markets.  Raff and Temin try to explain this 
away: “But Swift could not rely on independent suppliers to provide ice at the time and 
place he needed.  And the cost  to him of being without ice at that time and place was very 
great.  … Swift could be held up by the owner of an icehouse who had the only ice in the 
neighborhood” (p. 25).  But this won’t do.  The theory of asset specificity is an equilibrium 
proposition.  In equilibrium, no ice-house master could have threatened to hold Swift up, 
since Swift had a credible threat to replace his custom, and none of Swift’s assets would 
depreciate in equilibrium as a result.  Of course, Swift cared not a wit about equilibrium.  He 
was worried about all interruptions in service, which – and here is the point – could happen 
for many reasons in addition to hold-up threats.  The ice-house owner could simply be 
incompetent, or he could have a bad hair day.  (Or Swift had acquired superior capabilities 
for managing the movement of ice to refrigerated cars because he had specialized in that 
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As Porter and Livesay (1971, p. 171) argue, the development of an integrated 
(non-independent) system of branch houses was “a response to the inadequacies 
of the existing jobber system.” 
But explaining the origins of vertical integration (or any other structure of 
organization) doesn’t necessarily explain why that structure persists.  If 
integration is temporarily necessary but otherwise grossly inefficient, we would 
expect the integration to be undone over time.  And there are certainly examples 
of this.14  But it is also possible that a structure of organization can persist 
because of “path dependence.”  A structure can be self-reinforcing in ways that 
make it difficult to switch to other structures.  For example, the nature of 
learning within a vertically integrated structure may reinforce integration, since 
learning about how to make that structure work may be favored over learning 
                                                                                                                                                 
business, and it was more costly for him to transfer that knowledge to others than to 
integrate.)  Even if the owner is guileless and well intentioned, the high-throughput system 
would be at risk.  Nor does it help to say that, although nonspecific in any ordinary sense, 
the ice had the character of time specificity or location specificity.  Apart from forcing the 
notion of asset specificity to dance on the head of a pin, this ignores the fact that the costs of 
time and location specificity – what I call dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 1992b) – do 
not depend on the threat of holdup but can arise from a multitude of causes.  The threat of 
hold-up in the face of specific assets is but a small subset of the much wider problems of 
buffering that managers of high-throughput systems face. 
14  As Chandler (1992, pp. 88-89) notes: “integration … should be seen in terms of the  
enterprise's specific capabilities and needs at the time of the transaction.  For example, 
Williamson (1985, p. 119) notes that: ‘Manufacturers appear sometimes to have operated on 
the mistaken premise that more integration is always preferable to less.’ He considers 
backward integration at Pabst Brewing, Singer Sewing Machine, McCormack [sic] 
Harvester, and Ford ‘from a transaction cost point of view would appear to be mistakes.’  
But when those companies actually made this investment, the supply network was unable to 
provide the steady flow of a wide variety of new highly specialized goods essential to assure 
the cost advantages of scale.  As their industries grew and especially as the demand for 
replacement parts and accessories expanded, so too did the number of suppliers who had 
acquired the necessary capabilities.” 
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about alternative structures.15  A structure may also persist simply because the 
environment in which it operates is not rigorous enough to demand change.  
And organizations can sometimes influence their environments — by soliciting 
government regulation, for instance — in ways that reduces competitive rigors. 
In the end, however, structures that persist for significant amounts of time 
may indeed do so because they solve the design problem well — or at least well 
enough.16  Surely this is Chandler’s claim:  the large vertically integrated 
managerial corporation persisted because it was the appropriate solution for the 
design problem of its day.  Reading Chandler and his interpreters, we can 
discern the outlines of that solution. 
At the price of high fixed costs, one could create low average costs — at 
least so long as one could reliably utilize the fixed assets to capacity.   
In the capital-intensive industries the throughput needed to 
maintain minimum efficient scale requires careful coordination not 
only of the flow through the processes of production but also of the 
flow of inputs from suppliers and the flow of outputs to 
intermediaries and final users. 
Such coordination did not, and indeed could not, happen 
automatically.  It demanded the constant attention of a managerial 
team or hierarchy.  The potential economies of scale and scope, as 
measured by rated capacity, are the physical characteristics of the 
production facilities.  The actual economies of scale or of scope, as 
                                                 
15  See Langlois and Robertson (1989, pp. 367-368) for an example from the early years of the 
Ford Motor Company. 
16  Biologists understand that, to avoid a tautological theory, evolutionary explanation must 
mean showing how the biological structure in question would meet “an engineer’s criterion 
of good design” (Gould 1977, p. 42). 
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determined by throughput, are organizational.  Such economies 
depend on knowledge, skill, experience, and teamwork -- on the 
organized human capabilities essential to exploit the potential of 
technological processes.  (Chandler 1990, p. 24.) 
In a world of decentralized production, most costs are variable costs; so, when 
variations or interruptions in product flow interfere with output, costs decline 
more or less in line with revenues.  But when high-throughput production is 
accomplished by means of high-fixed-cost machinery and organization, 
variations and interruptions leave significant overheads uncovered.  Chandler 
would say that uncontrolled variation in work flows lowers the effective 
economies of scale available.  Integration and management are an attempt to 
control — to buffer — product-flow uncertainty.   
Employing a finely sliced division of labor or large integrated machines or 
both, traditional mass production always requires the elimination of variation 
between stages of production.  Although never fully realized until the day in 
1908 when three of Henry Leland’s Cadillacs emerged perfect from a heap of 
scrambled parts in Brooklands, Surrey,17 the promise of interchangeable parts 
had animated the quest for mass production throughout the nineteenth century 
(Hounshell 1984).  As the Brooklands episode suggests, interchangeable parts 
create a more modular design: parts can be swapped in and out.  At the same 
                                                 
17  For this feat Leland was awarded the Dewar Trophy as winner of the first Standardization 
Test of the Royal Automobile Club.  Cadillac’s British operation had in fact instigated the 
competition as a publicity stunt, and Cadillac was the only contestant; but Cadillac was also 
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time, however, standardization eliminates one form of “loose coupling” possible 
in crafts production.18  Variation in the components becomes increasingly 
intolerable.  In the classic form of mass production, so does variation in the final 
product: as Henry Ford supposedly remarked, you can have any color Model-T 
you want so long as it’s black.  Moreover, mass production requires operatives 
(including, eventually, machines) to carry out an unambiguous sequence of steps 
— a computer program, in effect.  Thus the design of the overall production 
process becomes more highly structured, while discretion and variation are 
eliminated from the individual stages, a process that unsympathetic scholars 
have labeled “deskilling” (Marglin 1974) and “fordism” (Sabel 1982).   
One important implication of this is that standardization and high 
throughput do not eliminate the need to buffer uncertainty; indeed, they make it 
all the more urgent — for any variation that finds its way into a high-throughput 
system can bring production to a crashing halt.  What buffers uncertainty in 
Chandlerian managerial capitalism is exactly what buffers uncertainty in crafts 
production or non-specialized merchandising: the information-processing ability 
of human managers.  Because of the new high-throughput structure of 
production, however, that buffering is no longer distributed to the individual 
stages of production — from which standardization has eliminated variation — 
                                                                                                                                                 
the only manufacturer capable of the precise machining tolerances necessary to pass the test 
(Leland and Millbrook 1966, chapter 1). 
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but has effectively moved “up the hierarchy” to the managers who control the 
work flow19 (Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64).   
Professional management is specialization in one sense: the manager is 
manager only and not in any important way a capitalist or anything else.  But, 
like the merchant of yore, the manager is also a generalist: the manager is skilled 
in general techniques of management independent of any specific firm or 
industry.  The nonspecific training of managers was abetted in the twentieth 
century by the rise of the business school, which, like other professional schools 
emerging at the same time, equipped its students with a standardized “toolkit” 
(Langlois and Savage 2001).  This shouldn’t be surprising.  Chandlerian 
managers are generalists for the same reason that crafts artisans and merchants 
are generalists: because their function is to buffer uncertainty.  They need a wide 
range of skills that can be applied flexibly in response to an unpredictable array 
of concrete circumstances.  
                                                                                                                                                 
18  Contrary to what is sometimes said in the literature on modular product design, modularity 
does not imply loose coupling, nor does nonmodularity imply tight coupling. 
19  Top managers will not be the only buffers, of course.  They will be aided by a large number 
of discretionary workers at multiple levels.  “There will generally be a separate set of skilled 
manual work departments (maintenance, tool and die making, and special departments that 
vary with the technology, such as the crew who lay firebricks inside steel furnaces) and 
skilled staff workers at the managerial levels (engineering, quality control and inspection, 
scheduling and inventory), besides the whole routinized structure of the production line and 
the ‘line’ supervisory structure that keeps it running” (Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64). 
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From scale to scope: the corporate century. 
In setting up managerial structures to buffer high-throughput production, the 
large corporations of the late nineteenth century created something more: a 
system of organizational capabilities.20  Geared initially toward the management of 
scale, these organizational capabilities soon enabled corporations to expand their 
scope.  In Chandler’s words, they “provided an internal dynamic for the 
continuing growth of the enterprise.  In particular, they stimulated its owners 
and managers to expand into more distant markets in their own country and 
then to become multinational by moving abroad.  They also encouraged the firm 
to diversify by developing products competitive in markets other than the 
original one and so to become multiproduct enterprises” (Chandler 1990, pp 8-9).  
As Edith Penrose (1959) had suggested, this is an important mechanism by 
which firms grow.  In her theory, firms consist of bundles of “resources,” 
including the managerial resources that Chandler and others call capabilities.  
Resources are often lumpy, and some are therefore in excess capacity.  This 
means that organizational capabilities developed in one area can spill over to 
new tasks at low marginal cost.  Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere (Langlois 
1999b), economies of scale and scope are ultimately made of the same stuff: they 
both involve the reuse of a structure of knowledge, in one case to stamp out more 
                                                 
20  G. B. Richardson (1972, p. 888), who coined the term, called capabilities the “knowledge 
experience, and skill” of the organization.  For further discussion of this idea, see Langlois 
and Robertson (1995, chapter2). 
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of the same product, in the other case to produce something different that 
requires similar knowledge.   
Especially early on, diversification was a matter of taking advantage of 
byproducts — the classic economies of scope of the textbook.  For example, Swift 
and other meatpackers sold fertilizer, leather, glue, soap, and other items made 
from the byproducts of the slaughterhouse (Chandler 1990, p. 168).  Significantly, 
firms diversified in a modular way by creating for the various products new 
organizational units that could be dropped into the overall corporate structure.  
By the twentieth century, however, diversification came to flow more from 
reusable facilities, knowledge, and business practices.  For instance, Swift and his 
competitors began to distribute butter, eggs, poultry, and fruit using the 
distribution system originally set up for meat (Chandler 1990, p. 168).  Notice 
that in moving from scale to scope, corporations became generalists to a greater 
extent, thus reversing the original trend toward product-oriented specialization 
— and away from generalist merchants — that had created those corporations in 
the first place.  I will suggest soon that the vanishing hand can be understood in 
part as a continuation of this process of the broadening of capabilities and their 
decoupling from specific products.   
For most of the twentieth century, of course, the process of capability-
building that Chandler describes did not challenge the structure of vertically 
integrated managerial capitalism.  Indeed, it reinforced it.  As Chandler (1997, p. 
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64) notes, after world War II especially, “the essential large-scale investments in 
both tangible and intangible capital were made not by new enterprises as they 
had been in the past, but primarily by well-established firms whose existing 
learned organizational capabilities were critical in developing and 
commercializing the potential the new technologies on a global scale.”  The large 
corporations were recreating significant parts of the U. S. value chain along new 
lines, which led them to grow internally in the path-dependent way implied by 
Penrose’s theory.   
Such growth placed increasing strain on corporate buffering mechanisms.  
In part, the firms responded by decentralizing divisions, a kind of buffering in 
emulation of the market.21  But, as Herbert Simon pointed out, buffering 
mechanisms, which help an organization respond better to variation, are not the 
only way to attack the problem of environmental uncertainty.  “If we want an 
organism or mechanism to behave effectively in a complex and changing 
environment,” he wrote, “we can design into it adaptive mechanisms that allow 
it to respond flexibly to the demands the environment places on it.  Alternatively, 
we can try to simplify and stabilize the environment.  We can adapt organism to 
environment or environment to organism” (Simon 1960, p. 33).  In the first 
century of the managerial revolution, large firms did indeed seek to simplify and 
                                                 
21  “Although the transformation from functional to product organizations [the M-Form] has 
usually been justified as a means to enhance control and coordination (Chandler 1962), it 
also is a way of segregating experience” (Levinthal and March 1993, p. 98). 
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stabilize their environments — a phenomenon that has absorbed the ink of 
legions of economists and pundits over the years.   
One class of such attempts falls within the broad purview of antitrust.  
That Chandler’s large corporations have typically been discussed — and for long 
periods exclusively discussed — from the perspective of trustification and 
monopoly is a story too tedious to tell here, and perhaps too trite to be worth 
telling.  Virtually alone among writers on the subject, Joseph Schumpeter argued 
that behavior derided as restrictive or “anticompetitive” actually can serve the 
function of controlling environmental uncertainty in a way that facilitates high-
throughput production — and thus increases rather than decreases output.   
Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of 
entrepreneurial action, certain safeguarding activities such as 
insuring or hedging.  Long-range investing under rapidly changing 
conditions, especially under conditions that change or may change 
at any moment under the impact of new commodities and 
technologies, is like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct 
but moving — and moving jerkily at that.  Hence it becomes 
necessary to resort to such protecting devices as patents or 
temporary secrecy of processes or, in some cases, long-period 
contracts secured in advance.  But these protecting devices which 
most economists accept as normal elements of rational 
management are only special cases of a larger class comprising 
many others which most economists condemn although they do 
not differ fundamentally from the recognized ones.  (Schumpeter 
1950, p. 88.) 
Schumpeter also had a more colorful term for what I have blandly called 
environmental variation or uncertainty: “the perennial gale of creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 84).   
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Notice that Schumpeter sees the corporation’s “safeguarding activities” as 
akin to buffering techniques like insuring and hedging.  Let me focus in on a 
couple of “protecting devices” that will be of significance down the road.  
Chandler has long maintained that, in effect, vertical integration is itself a 
mechanism for controlling the environment — by putting large parts of that 
environment under the influence of managerial buffering.  But within the 
vertically integrated structure of Figure 2, the stages of production with high 
fixed cost play a special role.  Industrial organization economists have laid great 
stress on the role of sunk costs in deterring competitive entry and generally 
slowing the competitive environment (Baumol 1982, Sutton 1991).  Fixed costs 
are not always sunk costs, of course; but they tend to become so when markets 
for the fixed assets are thin, as will be the case when those and comparable assets 
are isolated within the internal production of vertically integrated firms.  This is 
relevant to my story: for when markets become thicker, the “sunk” character of 
assets diminishes, which reduces the benefits of vertical integration. 
In some lines of business, vertical integration also threw up transaction-
cost problems of a more traditional sort.  This was especially true in consumer 
goods but also in some kinds of producer goods as well.  In the days of generalist 
wholesalers and retailers, merchants were not only purveyors of goods but also 
guarantors of quality.  Soap, flour, butter were undifferentiated products in 
whose quality the customer trusted because he or she trusted the retailer, whose 
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good name served as a kind of bond.  As high-speed continuous-process 
technology made it dramatically more economical for the producer rather than 
the wholesaler or retailer to package commodities (Chandler 1977, pp. 289ff.), the 
role of these latter in guaranteeing quality all but vanished.  In principle, this 
meant that the costs to consumers of verifying quality would increase, perhaps 
dramatically.  The solution to the problem, of course, was branding, which 
allowed the producer to speak, as it were, directly to the consumer and to utilize 
some of the same bonding mechanisms that the local grocer had once used22 
(Klein and Leffler 1981).  New generalist retailer like Sears and A&P also sprang 
up to carry a wide variety of branded products, and these were able to add the 
bonding power of their own names to that of the individual product brands, 
sometimes even selling the commodities under their own house brand (Kim 
                                                 
22  It is not correct to say, however, as Kim (2001) seems to imply, that the system of branded 
products supplanted the earlier system because of its superior transaction-cost properties.  
In Kim’s story, products became more sophisticated because of technological change, 
making it harder for consumers to judge quality directly.  This gave the advantage to big 
chain stores, which had large amounts of capital with which to bond quality.  As Chandler 
shows, however, the principal innovations in this period were in the nature of process 
technology.  Soap, beans, butter, cigarettes, etc. didn’t change much — but they could be 
packaged much more quickly by machine.  Moreover, even in the early nineteenth century, 
consumers could not directly discern the quality of products by casual inspection: many of 
the most famous cases of adulteration involved simple commodities like bread or flour.  
And small generalist retailers were often perfectly capable of certifying the weight and 
purity of even sophisticated commodities like pharmaceuticals; only now are pharmacists 
being supplanted by branding, and that is because of a change in the sophistication of 
testing equipment (Savage 1994).  In the end, the system of branding arose to solve a 
transaction cost problem caused by — but that was arguably small in comparison with — 
the major production-cost gains from new process technology.  Whether branding is 
superior to local certification and bonding on purely transaction-cost grounds is an open 
question. 
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2001).  In addition, the large multiunit retailers were able to create capabilities, 
and to exploit scale economies, in quality management and assurance. 
Branding did more than solve a transaction-cost problem, of course.  It 
was another method of attempting to control the environment in order to reduce 
variation and uncertainty.  This is clear even from a standard neoclassical 
textbook.  By creating a product differentiated in the eyes of the consumer, a firm 
can enjoy a more inelastic demand curve, which damps fluctuations in price and 
quantity.  And branding is what makes product differentiation possible.  Even if 
quality is the brand’s only distinguishing characteristic — as was arguably the 
case for commodities like branded gasoline — branding will still have this 
damping effect (Klein and Leffler 1981). 
All of these methods of attempting to control the environment pale in 
comparison with getting the government involved.  Economists and political 
scientists have long since come around to the idea that regulation is something 
that firms and industries often work hard to bring upon themselves (Kolko 1963; 
Stigler 1971).  Politicians are often anxious to supply regulation, as it earns them 
the political support they crave.  And firms are equally anxious demanders of 
regulation, as it serves their interests.  Those interests are normally understood in 
terms of increased profits from government-managed cartelization and 
restrictions on competitive entry.  But clearly government can also serve a 
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damping function.23  It provides an environment alternative to, or at least 
supplementary to, the market — an environment that is either inherently less 
variable or that can be more easily dealt with by the buffering mechanisms of 
management.  Of course, not all industries fit this picture:  it is doubtful that 
regulation of taxicabs in major cities or of interstate trucks under the old regime 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission had much to do with buffering in a 
world of high fixed costs.  But many other industries, often supposed “natural 
monopolies” in undifferentiated products like electricity, phone service, or 
natural gas transmission, may have sought regulation in part to help control a 
complex, internally managed production system containing critical components 
with high fixed costs.24  Even in industries not directly regulated by agencies, 
government action often came in handy as “safeguarding activities” to buffer 
demand shocks or to provide a cushion of economic rents. 
Although the problems of buffering high-throughput production have not 
made much impression on the mainstream literature on government and 
business, there is a line of thought along the fringes that takes this problem as 
                                                 
23  Government may also be enlisted to serve the quality guaranteeing function alluded to 
earlier.  A classic example of this is the institution of federal inspection of meat (Libecap 
1992). 
24  I don’t mean this to suggest that such regulation is therefore obviously desirable.  Although 
regulation may indeed serve the function of smoothing the environment, and thus of 
helping a highly integrated structure to make good use of its high-throughput assets, it also 
has the effect of freezing the environment and of insulating the organization from the 
changing configuration of relative scarcities and transaction costs in the economy.  Without 
regulation, firms have to control variation by making themselves more adaptable, which 
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central.  Running roughly from Thorstein Veblen (1921) to William Lazonick 
(1991), this literature sees it as crucial that managers be insulated from the 
vagaries of the environment, especially those caused by financial and other 
markets.  Veblen considered financial markets “industrial sabotage.”  The most 
eloquent voice in this tradition belonged, however, to John Kenneth Galbraith, 
whose New Industrial State distilled through hyperbole the essence of the 
corporate century he could see stretching behind him in 1967.  Galbraith takes it 
for granted that technological change always leads to greater complexity and 
scale.  This complexity and scale requires “planning”; such is the imperative of 
technology, an imperative that can only grow stronger in the future.  Planning 
means not only the attempt to foresee and prepare for future contingencies but 
also the removal of transactions from the market to the realm of managerial 
authority.  “If, with advancing technology and associated specialization, the 
market becomes increasingly unreliable, industrial planning will become 
increasingly impossible unless the market also gives way to planning.  Much of 
what the firm regards as planning consists in minimizing or getting rid of market 
influences”25 (Galbraith 1971, pp. 42-43).   
It is perhaps a fitting reward for the hubris this view of planning implies 
that the not-too-distant future had in store a picture of technology and 
                                                                                                                                                 
may be a better long-run outcome.  At the end of the twentieth century, as we will see 
presently, even regulation couldn’t protect firms from the need to adapt their structures. 
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organization that would be virtually the diametric opposite of the one Galbraith 
painted. 
From internal to external capabilities: the new economy. 
Ruttan and Hayami (1984) have proposed a theory of institutional change that is 
relevant to my story of organizational-and-institutional change.  As they see it, 
changes in relative scarcities, typically driven by changes in technology, create a 
demand for institutional change by dangling new sources of economic rent 
before the eyes of potential institutional innovators.  Whether change occurs will 
depend on whether those in a position to generate it — or to block it — can be 
suitably persuaded.  Since persuasion typically involves the direct or indirect 
sharing of the available rents, the probability of change increases as the rents 
increase.  And the more an institutional or organization system becomes 
misaligned with economic realities, the more the rents of realignment increase. 
By the 1980s, the large corporation that had looked inevitable and 
invincible in the 1950s and 1960s had become an organizational structure 
increasingly misaligned with economic realities — and an organization in the 
process of redefining itself.  Quite apart from any mechanisms of environmental 
control they may have themselves created, the large American corporations after 
World War II benefited from the attenuated climate of competition that came 
                                                                                                                                                 
25  The syllogism continues, of course.  Since a little planning is good, a lot must surely be 
better.  So the government should largely replace the market system with central planning. 
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with the destruction of the German, Japanese, and other economies.  As those 
economies revived and trade began expanding by the 1970s, the easy life was 
coming to an end.  Indeed, by the 80s and 90s, the image of invincibility had been 
virtually replaced by its opposite.  As Mark Roe notes, “the image of the 
corporation as a sweating and not-always-successful competitor has become 
more vivid” (Roe 1996, p. 106).  
The American corporation’s mechanisms of environmental control and its 
charmed life in the 50s and 60s had permitted it largely to ignore ongoing 
changes in the scale of technology as well as the increasing thickness and 
realignment of markets.  In startling contrast to Galbraith’s (rather nineteenth-
century) view of technological change, innovation often — and perhaps mostly 
— proceeds by simplifying and by reducing scale.26  Arguably, this has been the 
dominant trend of the twentieth century.27  For example, in electricity generation, 
among the most scale-intensive of fields, the development of aero-derivative 
combined-cycle generating technology (CCGT) has significantly reduced the 
                                                 
26  This seems to have been Adam Smith’s (eighteenth-century) view.  What drives innovation 
is the desire to perform a given set of operations more elegantly and economically.  (Smith 
1976, I.1.8.) 
27  I mean this as a long-run proposition.  In the short run, innovation can certainly increase 
scale.  Moreover, the effect of technological change on scale is sometimes subtle, in that scale 
reduction in one part of the system can lead to increased scale elsewhere.  The advent of the 
small electric motor (eventually) led to the demise of highly centralized steam power in 
factories (David 1990); but it also increased the extent of the market for electric power and 
(initially at least) helped increase the scale of its generation.  Indeed, in some cases, the 
Internet and FedEx have clearly had the same scale-increasing effect as the telegraph and the 
railroad: think of Amazon.com.  But over time, holding all else constant, the scale of a given 
technology tends to decline.  (On this point see also Langlois 1999a, p. 56.)  
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minimum efficient scale of new electric capacity (Joskow 1997, p. 123).  In 
telephony, the rise of semiconductor technology in general and the development 
of the private branch exchange (PBX) in particular turned switching from a 
centralized to a decentralized-network technology (Vietor 1994, p. 188).  At the 
same time, rising populations, rising income, and newly vibrant international 
trade generated thicker markets.  This meant, among other things, that, even 
where technology was not threatening to reduce scale, existing structures of 
fixed cost shrank relative to the extent of the market.  For example, by the time 
CCGT had arrived, increases in market size had long since stripped electric 
power generation of its natural-monopoly character (Joskow and Schmalensee 
1983).   
My argument is that these changes in technology and markets opened up 
attractive rent-seeking possibilities that could be seized only by breaking down 
or “unbundling” the vertical structure of the managerial corporation.  This is 
perhaps clearest in what most had long considered the intractable cases of 
vertical integration: regulated utilities.  We need only think of long-distance 
telephony, in which a scale-reducing technical change — microwave 
transmission, in this case — created opportunities for whoever could open up 
AT&T’s legal hold on the field.28  Entrepreneur William McGowan of MCI 
                                                 
28  In this case, the possibilities arose in part because of AT&T’s pricing structure, which for 
political reasons had subsidized local service at the expense of long distance — a 
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poured resources first into persuading the Federal Communications Commission 
to alter its policies and then into fomenting the breakup of AT&T (Temin 1987).  
Similar tales can be told for the deregulation of electricity (Kench 2000) and other 
industries.  A similar process of unbundling is also underway in less-regulated 
industries, where the impediments to supplying organizational change are 
substantially lower though not necessarily absent. 
In some respects, the internal dynamic of scale and scope that Chandler 
chronicles contributed in an almost Hegelian fashion to the corporation’s own 
undoing.  Driven by the Chandler-Penrose imperative to apply existing 
managerial skills and other capabilities more widely, the corporation in the 1960s 
took the idea of diversification to new levels.29  ITT was the paradigm.  
Originally an international supplier of telephone switching equipment, it bought, 
among other things, an insurance company, a hotel chain, and the maker of 
Hostess Twinkies.  In assembling conglomerates, as Mark Roe (1996, p. 113) 
argues, “managers learned that they could move subsidiaries and divisions 
around like pieces on a chessboard.” 
Conglomerates were assembled from separate firms, with a central 
headquarters directing the firm.  Their widespread use in the 1960s 
taught managers that it was possible to mix and match corporate 
                                                                                                                                                 
misalignment with relative scarcities made possible by AT&T’s status as a regulated 
monopoly (Vietor 1994, p. 183).   
29  Of course, there were institutional factors as well.  Roe (1996) points to the favorable tax 
treatment of retained earnings relative to dividends.  Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argue that 
stringent antirust policy in the 1960s discouraged cash-rich firms from acquiring companies 
in related industries, forcing them into unrelated diversification. 
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divisions.  It was only a small leap of an organizational idea for a 
conglomerate to bring in an outside firm via a hostile acquisition by 
buying up the target’s stock and tucking the formerly independent 
firm in as one now managed from the conglomerate headquarters.  
From there it was only another small mental jump in the 1980s to 
understand that once the pieces of a conglomerate had been 
assembled, they could be disassembled as well. (Roe 1996, p. 114.) 
Notice also that the managers could move divisions around like pieces on a 
chessboard in the first instance because of the modular structure of the M-form. 
Aided by innovations in the securities markets, the leveraged-buyout 
wave of the 1980s disassembled the conglomerate of the 1960s.  “By and large,” 
write Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990, p. 2), “hostile takeovers represent the 
deconglomeration of American business and a return to corporate 
specialization.”  Indeed, specialization became the strategic catchword of the 
1990s.  Whereas the most influential text on corporate strategy in 1980, that of 
Michael Porter, had counseled its readers to profit through buffering 
mechanisms and the control of the environment, the leading gurus of the next 
decade taught that the keys to success lay within and that firms could prosper 
only by returning to their core competences (Prahalad and Hamel 1990).  
Shoemaker, stick to your last. 
What has been less well observed, however, is that the changes of the 
1980s did not amount to a return to the pre-conglomerate days of the 1950s, to 
the “modern corporation” that Chandler had described.  Something fundamental 
had changed.  If a corporation – even a non-conglomerated one -- is a vertical 
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amalgam of division-modules, then the logical extension of the idea of corporate 
specialization would be to hive off not only unrelated divisions but also 
vertically related divisions as well.  As G. B Richardson (1972) pointed out, it is 
highly unlikely that the various vertical stages of a production process should all 
call for similar kinds of capabilities.   
And this is what has happened.  “Even a cursory examination of the 
industrial system of the United States in the 1990s reveals organizational patterns 
that look not at all like the modern corporation,” writes Timothy Sturgeon. 
The largest single employer in the country is not General Motors, 
but a temporary employment agency called Manpower Inc.  The 
largest owner of passenger jets is not United Airlines, or any other 
major carrier, but the aircraft leasing arm of General Electric. 
American automakers have spun-off their in-house parts 
subsidiaries and outsourced the design and manufacture of entire 
automotive sub-systems to first-tier suppliers.  Since 1992, IBM has 
literally turned itself inside-out, becoming a merchant provider of 
the basic components it had previously guarded so jealously for 
exclusive use in its own products.  If what we see today seems to 
have little relation to the ideal type of the modern corporation, 
there may be good reason.  Perhaps the American industrial system 
has begun to adapt to the new, more intense global competitive 
environment that triggered the competitive crisis in the first place. 
Perhaps we are witnessing the rise of a new American model of 
industrial organization, and not simply the resurgence of the old 
(Sturgeon 2000, pp. 6-7). 
Figure 3 is a picture of this new model.  In many respects, its structure looks 
more like that of the antebellum era than like that of the era of managerial 
capitalism.  Production takes place in numerous distinct firms, whose outputs 
are coordinated through market exchange broadly understood.  It is in this sense 
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that the visible hand of management is disappearing.  Unlike the antebellum 
structure, however, the new economy is a high-throughput system, with flows of 
work even more closely coordinated than in a classic Chandlerian hierarchy. 
Vertical disintegration and specialization is perhaps the most significant 
organizational development of the 1990s, largely ignored in economics but 
amply documented in the business press.  The following examples are 
illustrative but by no means exhaustive.  In electronics, firms like SCI Systems, 
Solectron, and Flextronics specialize in assembling on contract electronic systems 
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Figure 3: the New Economy value chain.  
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of all sorts (Sturgeon 2000).  But they neither design30 nor distribute nor market 
the systems themselves.  In pharmaceuticals, the major integrated companies are 
increasingly outsourcing manufacturing and marketing to firms like DSM 
Catalytica and clinical trials to contract research firms like Quintiles 
Transnational and Covance (Dolan and Meredith 2001).  A major new trend in 
semiconductor manufacturing has been the rise of so-called fabless 
semiconductor firms.  These firms retain design, development, and marketing 
functions but do not own their own manufacturing plants (called “fabs” in 
industry argot); instead, they contract out the actual manufacture of the chips to 
specialized “silicon foundries” (Langlois and Steinmueller 1999, p. 51).  Led by 
Chrysler in the 1990s, American automobile manufacturers began to modularize 
their product design and supply chain strategies and to rely more heavily on 
subcontratcors31 (Fine 1998, pp. 61-62).  The litany could continue.   
This is specialization, of course.  But notice also that these subcontractors 
are also generalists.  Flextronics will put together virtually any kind of electronic 
device you ask it to; DSM Catalytica will produce whatever drug you hand it; 
and the silicon foundries of Taiwan (and elsewhere) will manufacture whatever 
                                                 
30  More correctly, they do not brand their own systems.  These firms will often supply design 
and engineering services when asked.  For example, Flextronics and Solectron not only 
manufactured the Handspring Visor but were also involved in its design in order to smooth 
manufacturing and quicken time to market (Dolan and Meredith 2001).  On the other hand, 
design services are a specialty that can also be purchased on the market.  Ideo, a specialist 
design firm, is responsible for Handspring’s new model, the Visor Edge.  
31  In 2000, the American Big Three and several other car makers formed an electronic B2B 
supplier network called Covisint.  
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chip design you send them electronically.  In the auto industry, parts suppliers 
are generalizing their capabilities across major subsystems (Fine 1998, p. 65).  
This coupling of specialization of function with generalization of capabilities 
recalls the generalist merchants of the early republic.32  It is in fact a typical 
feature of the Smithian process.  In his famous analysis of that process, George 
Stigler (1951, p. 192) referred to what he called “general specialties.”  He had in 
mind activities like railroads, shipping, and banking that can benefit a variety of 
industries; but contract suppliers are clearly examples in the small – microcosmic 
instances of what economists now call general-purpose technologies (Helpman 
1998).  This trend toward general specialties is a continuation of the process of 
decoupling capabilities from products that Chandler observed in Scale and Scope.  
It is also a mechanism by which the market system buffers uncertainty.  Since a 
general specialist is not tied to a particular product or brand, taking in work from 
many purveyors of products and brands, it can diversify its portfolio more 
effectively.  This smoothes demand and facilitates high-throughput production. 
The relationships between subcontractors and their clients are clearly 
market relationships, even if they are also often collaborative relationships 
involving trust, permanence, and the transfer of rich information (Helper, 
MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000).  But in many sectors of the new economy — 
including some aspects of subcontracting — market relationships sometimes 
                                                 
32  Not to mention Chandlerian managers, who specialized in management but possessed 
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approximate the extreme of anonymous arms’-length spot contracts.  What 
makes such simple relationships possible is the increasing modularity of many 
products and organizational structures.33  In the Chandlerian firm, the visible 
hand of management – or at any rate the internal routines of coordination that 
management set up and oversaw -- provided the coordinative glue that held the 
stages of production together.  In the new economy, the visible hand has been 
socialized into technical standards34 that permit external mechanisms of 
coordination and reduce the need for rich information transfer.  At the same 
time, the buffering function that management had exercised is devolving to the 
buffering mechanisms of modularity and the market — informational 
decomposition, flexibility, and risk spreading. 
Just as did the high-throughput technologies of classical mass production, 
modular systems require and arise out of standardization.  But unlike classical 
mass-production technologies, which standardize the products or processes 
themselves, modular systems standardize something more abstract: the rules of 
                                                                                                                                                 
general management capabilities. 
33  In fact, of course, modularity actually lies behind the scene of many instances of 
collaborative market relationships as well.  Indeed, in the industry Helper, MacDuffie and 
Sabel use as their example – automobiles – what animates the new American collaboration, 
like Japanese collaboration before it, is increased modularity.  Rather than handing suppliers 
detailed instructions, manufacturers now give suppliers interface specifications and then 
encourage them to design the parts as they see fit.  So called first-tier suppliers may even be 
ceded authority for major components of the automobile (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).  
Although some collaboration and exchange of general knowledge takes place, the 
underlying design parameters of each part become hidden information from the perspective 
of the manufacturer. 
34 I am indebted to Martin Kenney for this phrase. 
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the game, or what Baldwin and Clark (2000) call visible design rules.  So long as 
they adhere to these rules, participants need not communicate the details of their 
own activities, which become hidden design parameters.  By taking standardization 
to a more abstract level, modularity reduces the need for management and 
integration to buffer uncertainty.  One way in which it does so is simply by 
reducing the amount of product standardization necessary to achieve high 
throughput.  This is the much-remarked-upon phenomenon of mass 
customization (Cox and Alm 1998).  For example, the highly modular structure 
of the personal computer as it developed during the 1970s and 1980s (Langlois 
1992a) made it possible for Michael Dell and others to begin selling PCs to order 
by assembling them like Legos from a set of standardized components (Kraemer 
and Dedrick 2001).  In so doing, PC makers could blanket more fully what 
economists call the product space (Langlois and Robertson 1992), that is, they 
could fine tune products more closely to the needs of individual users.  When 
economies of scale no longer require largely identical products to be 
manufactured en masse on spec, a major source of environmental uncertainty 
disappears, and with it the need to buffer that uncertainty.35 
                                                 
35  Flexible specialization didn’t originate with the Internet economy, of course.  General 
Motors pioneered an analogous strategy in the early automobile industry when it offered a 
variety of slightly differentiated variant models based on a common set of underlying mass-
produced parts (Raff 1991) — a classic American idea that Marshall (1920, I.viii.2, p. 141) 
called “multiform” standardization.   But when open modularity is feasible, the possible 
variants multiply greatly.  And the Internet has clearly accelerated the movement to mass 
customization by lowering the costs of acquiring information about the tastes of consumers. 
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When a modular product is imbedded in a decentralized production 
network, benefits also appear on the supply side36 (Langlois and Robertson 
1992).  For one thing, a modular system opens the technology up to a much 
wider set of capabilities.  Rather than being limited to the internal capabilities of 
even the most capable Chandlerian corporation, a modular system can benefit 
from the external capabilities of the entire economy.  External capabilities are an 
important aspect of the “extent of the market,” which encompasses not only the 
number of possible traders but also the cumulative skill, experience, and 
technology available to participants in the market.  Moreover, because it can 
generate economies of substitution (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995) or external 
economies of scope (Langlois and Robertson 1995), a modular system is not limited 
by the weakest link in the chain of corporate capabilities but can avail itself of the 
best modules the wider market has to offer.37  Moreover, an open modular 
                                                 
36  The supply-side aspect of modular standards have gone largely unnoticed in the economics 
literature, which has focused almost exclusively on the possibilities of demand-side network 
effects.   
37  This is not to say that a modular system will always outperform a nonmodular one.  In a 
theory related to the idea of dynamic transaction costs articulated earlier, Christensen, 
Verlinden, and Westerman (1999) have laid great stress on the ability of a nonmodular 
system to outperform a modular system.  In the short run (that is, holding the performance 
of available modules constant), a nonmodular system targeted toward high performance in a 
particular application can generally outperform a collection of off-the-shelf modules.  To 
Christensen and his coauthors, this means that vertical integration (which can best 
coordinate a nonmodular system) will prevail when performance is at a premium.  Later, 
however, as supply moves down the demand curve to those who require less performance, 
the baton passes to a modular system, since such as system can best compete on price and 
quantity, which is what comes to matter in a market less interested in performance.  This is 
certainly a persuasive story in the context of a number of high-tech products.  But one 
should keep in mind that, in the long run, the modular system may come to outperform the 
highly optimized nonmodular system because of the supply-side mechanisms detailed here.  
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system can spur innovation, since, in allowing many more entry points for new 
ideas, it can create what Nelson and Winter (1977) call rapid trial-and-error 
learning.38  From the perspective of the present argument, however, the crucial 
supply side benefit of a modular production network is that it provides an 
additional mechanism of buffering.   
The case of Enron illustrates how markets — eventually including 
electronic exchange markets — came to solve the buffering problem.  Enron was 
formed in 1985 by the merger of two established natural gas pipeline firms.  By 
the end of the 1980s, the company began responding to the deregulation of 
natural gas transmission by inventing “products” that could be traded on liquid 
markets.  In effect, Enron did this by creating novel financial contracts 
complementary to the company’s physical assets. 
In 1989 negotiations broke down with a Louisiana aluminum 
producer who sought to obtain fixed-price gas from Enron. Enron’s 
costs to physically transport the gas made the transaction 
unattractive.  Just as everyone was getting up from the negotiating 
table, the negotiating team suggested that the aluminum firm 
continue to buy its gas locally — at floating prices, plus 
transportation costs.  Enron could then write a financial contract in 
which the aluminum producer would effectively pay Enron fixed 
payments while Enron paid the producer’s floating prices. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
To put it another way, innovation in a previous modular system may be a precondition for 
the high performance of the succeeding generation of nonmodular system. 
38  Baldwin and Clark (2000) have recently explicated this last point in the language of finance 
theory.  If we think of each experiment taking place in the system as a real option, then an 
open modular system can create more value than a closed corporation even if the same 
number of experiments takes place in each system.  This is a consequence of the theorem in 
finance that says that a portfolio of options (the modular system) is worth more than an 
option on a portfolio (the experiments within the corporation). 
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aluminum producer could minimize its costs of physically 
obtaining gas, while using a financial contract to tailor the form of 
its payments.  Though the Enron team did not realize it at the time, 
they had executed what in hindsight was one of the first natural 
gas swaps. … From 1990 through 1993, Enron spent $60 million to 
develop its Financial Trading System, staffed by a mix of gas 
experts and Wall Street traders, to develop an information and 
trading system that permitted the organization to function as the 
trading desk of an investment bank. (Bhatnagar and Tufano 1995, 
p. 5.) 
On the supply side, Enron revived a turn-of-the century contract, now called a 
Volumetric Production Payment (VPP), to securitize ownership rights to gas 
reserves in an alienable way.  The company then applied the idea of modular 
tradable rights to other areas such as electricity, and it now maintains major 
electronic exchanges trading a wide variety of commodities, including 
bandwidth, over the Internet.39 
The reader may have noticed that the Internet and other present-day 
technologies of coordination have played a supporting role in my story rather 
than a starring role.  This is somewhat in contrast to the billing technology has 
received in other venues.  For example, in an argument akin to the vanishing-
hand thesis offered here, Malone and Laubacher (1998, p. 147) take changing 
information technology as central.  “The coordination technologies of the 
industrial era — the train and the telegraph, the automobile and the telephone, 
the mainframe computer — made internal transactions not only possible but 
 - 50 - 
advantageous.”  But the development of even more powerful coordination 
technology — personal computers and broadband communication networks — 
has had precisely the opposite effect.  “Because information can be shared 
instantly and inexpensively among many people in many locations, the value of 
centralized decision making and expensive bureaucracies decreases” (p. 147). 
This is certainly part of the story.  But the hypothesis I offer here is a bit 
more subtle — or at least a bit more complicated — and arguably more general.  
In my view, the phenomenon of the vanishing hand is a further continuation of 
the Smithian process of the division of labor on which Chandler’s managerial 
revolution was a way station.  Thus the vanishing hand is driven not just by 
changes in coordination technology but also by changes in the extent of markets 
— by increasing population and income, but also by the globalization of markets.  
Reductions of political barriers to trade around the world are having an effect 
analogous to the reduction of technological barriers to trade in the America of 
the nineteenth century.  Is this a revolution or the continuation of a long-standing 
trend?  Again, the answer depends on one’s perspective.  My argument is that, 
just as the American “globalization” after the Civil War was revolutionary in its 
systemic reorganization of production toward standardization and volume, the 
new era is revolutionary in its systematic reorganization toward modular 
                                                                                                                                                 
39  “Enron's e-commerce site, which handled some 550m transactions with a notional value of 
$345 billion in 2000, its first full year of operation, is the most successful Internet effort of 
any firm in any business.”  (The Economist, February 10, 2001.) 
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systems in response both to changes in coordination technology and to plain-old 
increases in the extent of markets. 
Indeed, it is not clear that we are entitled to see coordination technology 
as an entirely exogenous influence on organization form.  Perhaps we might 
grant the deployment of the telegraph as an exogenous event that helped to 
integrate markets and thus helped bring about the managerial revolution.  But 
when we think of much of the rest of the technology employed by managerial 
organizations — from filing cabinets to carbon paper to typewriters to 
mimeograph machines (Yates 2000) — we might more usefully think in terms of 
the coevolution of technology and organization.  Physical and social 
technologies40 influence one another by each throwing up problems the other is 
challenged to solve.  On the one hand, this reinforces the notion that an 
organizational structure biases technological change in ways that reinforce that 
structure.  On the other hand, it reduces the extent to which we can view such 
technological change as independently causative.  Was the Internet an exogenous 
event like the telegraph that altered organizational form decisively?  Perhaps.  
But it is well to remember that, back when the currency of the digital world was 
dots and dashes rather than zeroes and ones, the international hub of e-
commerce was Manchester, England, where the telegraph served as a vibrant 
element in one of history’s most vertically disintegrated production systems – the 
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British cotton textile industry (Farnie 1979, p. 64).  In my view, the relationship 
among coordination technology, transaction costs, and industrial structure 
remains an open research agenda. 
Figure 4 summarizes the vanishing-hand thesis in visual form.  I have 
called the independent variable “thickness of markets,” which is driven by 
exogenous factors like population, income, and the height of technological and 
political trade barriers.  The vertical axis is called “urgency of buffering,” by 
                                                                                                                                                 
40  To use the language of Nelson and Sampat (2001).  Their point is that institutions – including 
generic organizational forms – evolve in much the same way that technology does. 
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Figure 4: the vanishing-hand hypothesis. 
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which I mean to capture the degree to which the technology of production is 
complex, sequential, and high-throughput.  Producing cotton cloth under the 
putting out system would have a low degree of urgency of buffering; producing 
electricity for the state of California would have a high degree of urgency of 
buffering.  The straight line moving northeast from the vertical axis represents 
the boundary between firm and market.  Above the line, buffering through 
integration and management is less costly; below the line, buffering through 
markets (of a thickness given on the horizontal axis) is preferable.  That the line 
slopes upward simply reflects the increased ability of markets to buffer product-
flow uncertainty as they thicken.   
The more-or-less parabolic curve superimposed on this space represents 
the vanishing-hand hypothesis.  Think of it as a path in time, rather like the plot 
of an explorer’s progress on a map.41  The possibilities for high-throughput 
technologies and mass production made possible in the late nineteenth century 
generated a rapid and sudden increase in the urgency of buffering.  This is 
reflected in the initially steep slope of the curve: markets were insufficiently thick 
to buffer product-flow uncertainty, just as they were initially too 
underdeveloped to handle financial risk.  Over time, two things happen:  (a) 
markets get thicker and (b) the urgency of buffering levels off and then begins to 
decline.  In part, urgency of buffering declines because technological change 
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begins to lower the minimum efficient scale of production.  But it also declines 
because improvements in coordination technology — whether applied within a 
firm or across firms — lower the cost (and therefore the urgency) of buffering. 
More or less arbitrarily, I have labeled as 1880 the point at which the path 
crosses the firm-market boundary.  This is the start of the Chandlerian 
revolution.  Equally arbitrarily, I label as 1990 the point at which the path crosses 
back.  This is the vanishing hand.  Far from being a general historical trend, the 
managerial revolution — in this interpretation — is a temporary episode that 
arose in a particular era as the result of uneven development in the Smithian 
process of the division of labor. 
The past and future of management. 
If, as I argue, the once visible hand of management is becoming increasingly 
ethereal, will the activity of management therefore pass away completely?  
Clearly not.  Management has always been with us and will always be with us.  
The antebellum merchants who traded in whale oil were managers, as are the 
executives at Enron who design new tradable securities and set up online 
exchange systems.  They are no less managers than the Chandlerian executives of 
Standard Oil or ExxonMobil.  Management is related to – maybe management is 
– the cognitive ability of humans to buffer the variability of an uncertain world 
                                                                                                                                                 
41  The technically inclined may want to view it as the projection onto two dimensions of a 
curve in three-dimensional space, with the third (z) dimension being time. 
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and to transform it into something more predictable.  Buffering of that sort will 
always be necessary, and it will flourish wherever human cognition has a 
comparative advantage as a buffering mechanism (Simon 1960).  The vanishing-
hand thesis is about the changing industrial structure of management or, to put it 
another way, about the changing comparative advantage of humans and markets 
in the task of buffering.   
My argument is about long-run tendencies.  In the short run, the economic 
environment may occasionally generate the very kind of circumstances that led 
to the managerial revolution.  For example, in the 1980s, when vertical 
unbundling was the rule of the day, Nicolas Hayek was busy creating a 
Chandlerian corporation out of the remnants of the fragmented Swiss watch 
industry (Langlois 1998).  Like Gustavus Swift, he needed to rearrange 
capabilities in a systemic way – and to do it quickly.42  Centralized ownership 
and control was the most effective way to bring about the necessary 
reorganization.  Nonetheless, this kind of integration is less and less likely to be 
the norm. 
At the risk of lapsing into a cliché of the business literature, the message of 
this thesis for management is that managers will need to learn how to define 
themselves in a world where markets and modular systems do some of the work 
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of buffering environmental variation.  In one sense, the executives at Enron are 
doing exactly what entrepreneurs in Chandler’s world were doing: actively 
remodularizing production to take advantage of the profit opportunities 
afforded them by the nature of markets and the transaction technology of the 
day.  Like Chandler’s managers, these executives had to invest resources to 
create new production technologies; they had to overcome the dynamic 
transaction costs of change by systemically reorganizing production and 
distribution.43  But rather than orienting management around high-throughput 
physical assets, the company oriented management around what Stinchcombe 
(1990) refers to as a fiduciary function: the business of transforming high-risk 
inputs into predictable, low-risk products.44   
As Enron executives think of it, the post-Chandlerian revolution of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is about “the transition from hard 
assets to soft assets.”  Or perhaps we might say: the transition back from hard 
assets to soft assets.  As we saw, the antebellum merchant relied on knowledge, 
skill, and adaptability.  That the new economy is a knowledge economy is 
                                                                                                                                                 
42  Unlike the case of Swift, however, it wasn’t the promise of scale economies that impelled 
Hayek but rather the creative destruction wrought by the Japanese development of 
electronic watch movements, which rendered obsolete existing Swiss capabilities in 
mechanical movements. 
43  For example, it took eighteen months and millions of dollars to craft the VPP contract 
(Bhatnagar and Tufano 1995, p. 7). 
44  Perhaps surprisingly, Stinchcombe’s example of fiduciary management is the research 
university, which transforms risky investments in the uncertain research programs of its 
faculty into the relatively standardized and liquid output of a university degree. 
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another cliché of our times.  And, although the Chandlerian manager might have 
claimed with some justification that knowledge was important to his or her job, it 
is nonetheless true that, as we saw, high-throughput assets were a crucial feature 
of the competitive landscape.  In the new modular economy, managers must look 
elsewhere for competitive advantage.  Recognizing the underlying fiduciary 
function of management may be a first step toward discovery. 
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